Abstract
Introduction
Enemy merchant vessels may be captured whenever they are located beyond neutral territory.
1 Under long-standing international practice, an enemy merchant vessel captured at sea is placed under the command of a prize crew and taken to a port of the seizing state or that of an ally, where a prize court convened by the seizing nation adjudicates the vessel's status and, if warranted, condemns the vessel, her cargo or both as a prize of war. Title to the seized vessel and, as warranted, her cargo, does not vest in her captors until the prize court issues this judicial decree of condemnation. 2 In the USA federal district courts, which exercise admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, serve as US prize courts. 3 In January 1916, the British steamship Appam was seized on the high seas by the German surface raider Möwe. Instead of being dispatched to a German port or that of an ally, she was conveyed to Hampton Roads, Virginia, a port of the USA, where she arrived, unannounced and uninvited, on 1 February 1916. There, her prize crew commander presented to US authorities a note written by Möwe's commanding officer announcing his intention that Appam be 'laid up' -in effect, interned -in a US port for an indefinite period, presumably the duration of the war. The German embassy quickly got involved, contending that such a practice was permitted, in fact required, by the terms of Article 19 of the Prusso-American Treaty of 10 September 1785 (1785 Treaty). 4 Not to be outdone, the British diplomatic corps strenuously objected to any American accommodation of the prize and her crew, arguing vociferously that under Articles 21 and 22 of the 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague Convention XIII) a prize could only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather or want of fuel or provisions, and as none of those conditions existed aboard the vessel, the USA was under an obligation to release the vessel with her officers and crew and to intern the prize crew. 5 US diplomatic officials, caught unprepared and facing a factually unique and difficult situation, struggled to find a solution that would not unnecessarily aggrieve one of these two powerful contenders. Before these officials could act, the matter was effectively wrested from their control and placed in the hands of the judiciary when Appam's owners and her captain filed suit in US court, seeking restitution of the vessel and her cargo respectively. The case ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, whose ruling, which was consonant with pronouncements issued by the secretary of state, served to set US policy with respect to prizes and neutrality in World War I and II and into the contemporary era.
This article recounts the circumstances surrounding Appam's capture and conveyance to the USA. It then traces the diplomatic spat that erupted from the moment she arrived in America, involving as it did two powerful belligerents engaged in a titanic global struggle and a powerful and influential neutral. Finally, the article follows the judicial developments in the case, culminating with decisions by both the commerce raider, armed with two 4.1 inch guns mounted under her forecastle, two of the same calibre mounted abaft the break of her forecastle, one 22 pounder mounted on the poop disguised as hand-steering gear and two above-water torpedo tubes. 15 She was also fitted to carry approximately 200 mines and was configured to deploy them. 16 She was under the command of Korvetten-Kapitän Graf Nicolaus zu Dohna-Schlodien. Her voyage up until her capture of Appam had been extraordinarily eventful. After setting out from Germany on 29 December 1915, she first laid mines on New Year's Day in 1916 off the east coast of Scotland, in what was known as the Whiten Head Bank minefield. 17 This effort bore spectacular fruit on 6 January when HMS Edward VII, a battleship, on her way to Belfast from Scapa Flow, struck a mine and sank. 18 Following this auspicious start, she laid a second minefield off La Rochelle on 9 January and then moved into the shipping lanes used by British merchant vessels voyaging to and from the Canary Islands as well as by vessels utilizing the major trade routes from South America and the west coast of Africa to Britain. 19 She was immediately rewarded with a rich haul of British and Allied vessels, capturing and sinking no less than six steamers carrying goods and supplies, which were vital to the Allied war effort, between 9-15 January. The crews of these hapless vessels were taken aboard Möwe, which began to bulge at the seams with so many unexpected guests.
The Capture of Appam and Subsequent Events
The morning of 15 January 1916 dawned fine and clear as Appam steamed northward, east of Madeira, on a course to pass 100 miles west of Cape Finisterre. 20 Her most recent port of call had been the Canary Islands. 21 During the course of the morning, she passed two southbound vessels. 22 At approximately 1:40 p.m., Captain Harrison went up to the bridge and had his attention drawn to a southbound vessel, approximately seven to eight miles off the starboard bow, which was assumed to be a cargo steamship on a southwesterly course. 23 As she drew nearer, the mystery vessel was observed to be flying British colours. When she drew within a mile of Appam's port bow, the vessel (which was, of course, Möwe) hauled down the British colours, 24 15 Ibid., at 198. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., at 199-200. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., at 201. 20 Letter from Bayley, supra note 9. 21 Phone call from N. Hamilton to A. Peters, 1 February 1916, Department of State World War I Records, NARA. 22 Official Statement of Captain Harrison, ADM 137/2755, TNA. 23 Ibid. 24 The use of false colours (enemy or neutral) by a warship is a practice sanctioned under customary law, though the warship must hoist its true colours prior to exercising any belligerent rights. replaced them with the German naval ensign and also hauled up two signal flags: 'stop immediately' and 'wireless operator'. 25 These demands were reinforced by a shot fired across Appam's bow. As Appam drifted to a stop, Möwe continued down her port side, rounded her stern and hove to a quarter mile off her starboard beam, firing a shot across Appam's stern as she did so.
Shortly thereafter, with several heavy guns trained on Appam to ensure compliance, Möwe dispatched a small boat containing a boarding party. Although the boarding officer politely apologized to Captain Harrison for taking his ship, the martial nature of the interaction was vividly illustrated by several bombs the boarding party placed aboard Appam. The boarding officer gathered the ship's papers and information about her cargo, speed, passengers and the like and signalled this information back to the raider. Captain Harrison, the majority of Appam's crew and the naval drafts from the west coast of Africa were conveyed to the raider, which was done in several trips aboard Appam's boat; there, they joined the crews of the other vessels previously captured and destroyed by Möwe. Appam's second officer, engineers, firemen and stewards, together with all of the passengers, were left aboard Appam and confined below. Bullion worth £36,000 was also transferred to Möwe at this time.
The two vessels steamed in company with each other until 17 January, at which time the crews of the previously captured vessels, totalling 138 persons (none of them Americans), were transferred to Appam; three British military officers, some naval ratings and marines and the African naval recruits were retained aboard Möwe.
26 A prize crew of 22 Germans under the command of Lieutenant Hans Berg was also placed aboard Appam; they were augmented by the seven liberated former German prisoners of war.
27 Korvetten-Kapitän zu Dohna-Schlodien informed those transferred to Appam that she would land them at a safe port and warned them that she was rigged with bombs and that he had instructed the prize crew to sink her before allowing her to be retaken. 28 She continued in company with Möwe until 19 January, at which time the two vessels parted -Appam setting on a westward course towards America, and Möwe heading for fresh hunting grounds off South America. 30 Information, sparse as it was, arrived, not from naval units but, rather, from Lloyds of London, which reported that the steamer Tregantle, which arrived at Hull on 26 January, reported having passed a lifeboat with ' Appam of Liverpool' painted on the stern 120 miles east-northeast of Madeira. 31 The weather in the vicinity was very fine and clear, there was no wreckage in the vicinity and the lifeboat, while its bow had been damaged, was still seaworthy. 32 There was no sign that any passengers had been aboard. 33 Tregantle's master believed Appam had been sunk by a submarine or a mine. 34 Other than this report, the only other information related as to the missing Appam was a report by the outbound steamer Palma, whose master related that she had passed Appam at 2 p.m. on 15 January, 40 miles north of Teneriffe.
British Authorities Mystified; US Authorities Flummoxed

35
British mystification regarding Appam's disappearance was more than matched by American officials' consternation when the vessel, flying German naval colours, unexpectedly appeared at the entrance to Hampton Roads on 1 February 1916, ultimately dropping anchor off Fortress Monroe in Hampton, Virginia, at 8 a.m. that same date. This prompted a flurry of calls and cables between officials on-site, particularly Norman Hamilton, the collector of customs, 36 and their superiors in Washington, DC, regarding the appropriate response to this startling situation. These officials were further mystified, and significantly discomfited, to discover she was under the command of a German prize crew whose commander, Lieutenant Hans Berg, presented them with a commission provided to him by zu Dohna-Schlodien, which read as follows:
Information for the American Authorities. The bearer of this, Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve Berg, is appointed by me to the command of the captured English steamer ' Appam,' and has orders to bring this ship into the nearest American harbor, and there to lay up. Count Zu Dohna, Cruiser Captain and Commander. 37 Were she to be laid up as intended, she would join two German auxiliary cruisers already interned in Hampton Roads for violating US neutrality laws by remaining in US waters after being ordered to leave: gave his word of honour as a German naval officer that he would not undertake to leave the USA, or permit any of his men to leave the USA, until authorized to do so by the US government.
38
Berg's demand to be allowed to 'lay up' was the first salvo in a bitter diplomatic row between the USA, Britain and Germany regarding the law of maritime neutralityparticularly, the duties and obligations of a neutral respecting a prize brought by a belligerent into its territory. Berg's note was swiftly followed by letters sent on 2 February and 8 February from the German ambassador to the USA, Count J.H. von Bernstorff, to the US secretary of state, Robert Lansing. In these letters, Bernstorff provided official notification to the USA of Appam's arrival and further stated that 'the commanding officer intends, in accordance with Article 19 of the Prusso-American treaty of September 10, 1785, to stay in an American port until further notice'. 39 Bernstorff also contended that Appam had not been used for warlike purposes while she was a prize and, thus, had not been converted into an auxiliary warship. 40 He concluded by requesting that the USA intern the 'locked-up military party of the enemy' and also the crew of Appam, who supposedly offered resistance to capture in a manner, so he contended, that converted them likewise into combatants.
41
Bernstorff 's missives raised a host of vexatious issues, all of which the USA had to eventually resolve in the course of fully and finally deciding how to deal with the Appam's presence in her waters. The most urgent matter was that of the disposition of the British subjects aboard the vessel. The closest precedent US authorities had to go by was the case of the Sitka, a Russian warship captured by the British in 1855 during the Crimean War and brought unescorted by a prize crew to San Francisco.
42
A writ of habeas corpus was served on behalf of two of the Russian crew members who were detained aboard as prisoners of war. 43 The US Attorney General ultimately opined that the Sitka was properly considered a public ship of war exempt from US jurisdiction, and, thus, the Russian prisoners could not be released by any order of the US government. 44 Such a conclusion, if followed in the Appam case, would vindicate Count Bernstorff 's argument and result in certain of the British subjects being detained indefinitely aboard Appam during her tenure in US waters, however long it may be. The British, through a series of conversations between her ambassador to the USA, Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, and Secretary of State Lansing, took the precisely opposite position from the one they had taken in 1855, with Spring-Rice urging that 'it was most 38 Letter from N. Hamilton to A. Peters, supra note 6. 39 undesirable that whatever the precedents in the past, British subjects should be held as prisoners in American territory by foreigners claiming the right of hospitality under a treaty over a hundred years old'. Spring-Rice had already formally protested the USA allegedly allowing German officials to visit the vessel, while denying that same right to British officials. 45 By such discrimination, he claimed, the USA would 'lay itself open to a charge of breach of neutrality'. 46 The USA, in contrast with its practice with respect to the other important issues raised in this case, resolved the issue of the British subjects aboard the vessel with promptitude. On 3 February, Hamilton met aboard Appam with Lieutenant Berg and Prince Hatzfeldt, councillor of the German embassy, and at the direction of the secretary of state, made an oral demand for the immediate release from Appam of all who desired to leave, except the prize officer, the prize crew and all those who had acted as members of the prize crew in the navigation of the ship. 47 Prince Hatzfeldt, upon being assured by Hamilton that this was the decision of the secretary of state, directed Berg to comply with the order. 48 Thus, it came to be that on 4 February, all British subjects, even the members of her armed forces, were permitted to depart Appam, along with all of their personal baggage. 49 Six days later, on 10 February, they left for England on the SS Baltic.
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This decision by the USA, which implicitly rejected Germany's arguments that some of the British subjects should be detained aboard the vessel, was considered by the Germans to constitute a 'tactical defeat'. 51 The Germans did score a related tactical victory of their own in the matter of the 13 civilians (12 German, one Austrian) aboard the vessel. Their status was unclear and depended on whether or not they had been 'incorporated' into the prize crew during the voyage to Hampton Roads. Berg acknowledged that they had been provided arms for self-defence, but he contended that they had not stood sentry duty or otherwise materially assisted the prize crew.
52
US authorities, perhaps wishing to ease the sting of the Germans' previous tactical defeat, did not press the issue and, on 11 February, granted permission for these civilians to depart from the vessel 'at will'. 
The Main Issue, the Law and Each Belligerent's Main Contention
These tactical skirmishes merely presaged, and were peripheral to, the main issue presented by Appam -that of her status under international law and the concomitant rights and obligations of the neutral nation, the USA, in whose waters she had arrived, unescorted and uninvited. As already mentioned, in a typical case, a prize such as Appam taken by a belligerent like Germany would have been sailed to a German port or that of an ally, 'where a prize court of that Nation might have adjudicated her status, and, if it so determined, condemned the vessel as a prize of war'. 54 This was obviously an atypical case, involving, as it did, a prize in neutral waters. The two principal bodies of law implicated in this case were the 1785 Treaty -Article 19 of which had been invoked by Bernstorff in his letters of 2 and 8 February -and general (or customary) international law, as reflected in the Hague Convention XIII. Both of these will be discussed in turn, and then the principal contentions of the two belligerent parties -Germany and Britain -will be examined.
The 1785 Treaty was the first treaty entered into between the USA and Prussia.
55
Such luminaries as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin were involved in the negotiation of its terms. 56 The 1785 Treaty was succeeded by the 1799 Prusso-American Treaty (1799 Treaty), and the wording of the article at issue -Article 19 -was essentially identical in the two treaties. 57 The interpretation of the relevant portions of this article (both treaties were in French) used by the Department of State in the Appam matter is as follows:
The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall carry freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their captors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show. The USA and Germany had already had reason to refer to the 1799 Treaty in the current war, and both nations had agreed that the treaty was still in effect between the two nations.
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With respect to Hague Convention XIII, the implicated substantive articles were Articles 21, 22 and 23. They read in relevant part as follows:
Article 21 -A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions. It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral Power must order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral Power must employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew. Article 22 -A neutral Power must, similarly, release a prize brought into one of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to in Article 21. Article 23 -A neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a Prize Court.
Also of relevance is Article 28, which states that '[t]he provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention'. Germany had ratified the convention, but Great Britain had not. Thus, by its literal terms, '[t]he provisions of the present Convention d[id] not apply' in the ongoing war, even to neutrals like the USA that had acceded to the convention. One of the major issues presented in the Appam case was the extent to which, notwithstanding Article 28, the provisions of Hague Convention XIII applied, either as a conventional obligation or as a reflection or statement of customary international law.
As with the 1799 Treaty, the USA had also applied Hague Convention XIII during the war -ironically, again related to the internment of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich -on the theory that most of its provisions reflected customary international law. 60 One provision of Hague Convention XIII, however, that the USA most decidedly did not consider to be reflective of customary international law was Article 23. With respect to this article, the US delegation at the Hague conference in 1907 reported to the secretary of state that:
Article 23 authorizes the neutral to permit prizes to enter its ports and to remain there pending action on their cases by the proper prize courts. This is objectionable for the reason that it involves a neutral in participation in the war to the extent of giving asylum to a prize which the belligerent may not be able to conduct to a home port. This article represents the revival of an ancient abuse and should not be approved.
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Due to its concern with Article 23, the USA initially did not sign Hague Convention XIII. When the USA ultimately decided to ratify the convention on 3 December 1909, 59 The USA and Germany had applied the 1799 Treaty's compensation and restitution provisions in the matter of the sinking of the US Turning now to each side's respective contentions in this case, the Germans argued that Article 19 of the 1799 Treaty 'authorizes a prize ship to remain in American ports as long as she pleases. Neither the ship nor the prize crew can therefore be interned nor can there be any question of turning the prize over to [the] English'. 63 As to Hague Convention XIII, the Germans contended that the convention did not apply due to Britain's non-accession, which was in accordance with Article 28. 64 Even if the convention did apply, the rules in Articles 21 and 22, which appear to operate to Germany's disadvantage, would not apply, as the preamble to Hague Convention XIII states that the convention will not modify existing treaties. 65 Thus, the rule expressed in Article 19 of a treaty that was already acknowledged by both Germany and the USA to still be in force would remain as the controlling law, notwithstanding anything purportedly to the contrary in Hague Convention XIII.
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As for the British, on 3 February, the Foreign Office instructed Spring-Rice to address a note to the Department of State demanding that Appam be ordered to leave the USA or be restored to her owners and the German prize crew interned. 67 This he did on 4 February, along with an exposition of the controlling law from the British standpoint. As to Article 19 of the 1799 Treaty, Spring-Rice quoted the 'revival of an ancient abuse' language in the report of the American delegation to Hague Convention XIII regarding Article 23 as proof that this treaty 'was regarded as obsolete and inconsistent with modern doctrines'. 68 The USA's later reservation with respect to Article 23 demonstrated to the British that, in so far as the provisions of the 1799 Treaty conflict with the convention, they were regarded as being overridden by the later instrument.
69
This 'later instrument' was Hague Covention XIII, specifically Article 21. SpringRice contended that Article 21 is a rule of 'general application', 70 and since Appam had not entered port for one of the acceptable reasons under Rule 21, the USA had an obligation to 'order it to leave at once; [and] should it fail to obey, ... [to] employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize 62 crew'. 71 Because the governing rule was one of general application, the British contended, the fact that Britain had not ratified the convention did not relieve the USA of the obligation to treat ships and property of all nations in accordance with Article 21's strictures.
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The Judiciary Steps In -and Takes Over
To the executive branch, specifically the State Department, fell the onus of resolving the very difficult issues presented by Appam or, at least, so it initially seemed. In his deliberations, the secretary of state drew upon the assistance of an interesting advisory body -the Joint State-Navy Neutrality Board. Lansing created this board in August 1914 to assist him in dealing with the extraordinarily difficult neutrality issues that were presented during World War I (most of which, ironically enough, involved the British and their aggressive actions towards US vessels at or near the three-mile limit of US waters).
73 Its members were James Brown Scott, a noted international lawyer and special advisor to the State Department, as chairman, and Captains H.S. Knapp and James H. Oliver of the US navy. 74 The Board's opinions were of considerable importance to Lansing and were often cited by him in recommendations he made to the president. 75 It swung into immediate action in the Appam case, providing Lansing with three extensive memos containing historical research, conclusions of law and policy recommendations within just over a week of the vessel's arrival in the USA in an effort to help him resolve the myriad legal issues the case presented.
The executive's movement towards a diplomatic resolution of the case was interrupted and ultimately derailed by the actions of private foreign parties, namely the vessel's owner and her captain ('libellants'), who sought recourse in the federal judiciary by filing two suits in admiralty in the Eastern District of Virginia. 76 In seeking a judicial remedy so soon after Appam's arrival in the USA, the private British parties acted contrary to the wishes of the British diplomatic corps, whose principals correctly anticipated that the lawsuit would give the State Department a convenient excuse to defer the tough legal and dispositional decisions both the Germans and British were demanding on the grounds that the matter was now in the jurisdiction of the court. 79 Their preference would have been to await a decision of the US government and only apply to the courts in the event that the decision was unfavourable. 80 Publicly, once the libels were filed, Spring-Rice informed the State Department that 'the British Government reserves all rights under accepted principles and practices of international law with respect to the Appam, and that any action taken in the matter by the owners in maintenance of [their] interests is not in any way to be considered as prejudicing any claim advanced or to be advanced by the British government'.
81
The Germans reacted with shock to the lawsuits, which were rendered even more unpalatable when the Deputy US Marshal in Norfolk boarded Appam on 19 February, served the libel in Case no. 650 on Berg and took custody of the vessel in the name of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, leaving two watchmen aboard the vessel in the process. 82 Their first counter-salvo was a visit by Berg and von Schilling to Hamilton at the Newport News Customs House, where they presented an unsigned note of protest, claiming that since the USA had declared Appam to be a prize, execution of the judicial process was not permitted by the 1799 Treaty. 83 The letter asked for the immediate removal of the watchmen left on board and for dismissal of the libel. 84 Berg later informed Hamilton that he would neither feed nor house the watchmen nor allow them to move from the spot where they had been dropped off.
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These German field-level assertions were supported and expanded upon by Bernstorff, who informed Lansing: 'You may well appreciate my surprise at the action which has been taken.'
86 He cited Article 19 to the effect that prizes brought to the USA under treaty provisions shall not be 'put under legal process when they come to and enter the ports of the other party' and that, as a result of the US action, he was 'at a loss to understand why such action has been taken by a court of your country'. 87 requesting that Lansing ask the attorney general to take the steps 'as may be necessary and proper to secure the prompt dismissal of the libel' 88 and, if that was not possible, by proposing that the case be referred to the Hague Court of Arbitration.
89
The USA's response, both with respect to the power of the judiciary to hear the case and the Germans' arbitration proposal, was unfavourable to the Germans. In a letter personally approved by the president, Lansing informed Bernstorff that '[w]hether in these circumstances the US court has properly or improperly assumed jurisdiction of the case and taken custody of the ship, is a legal question which, according to American practice, must now be decided by the municipal courts of this country'. 90 However, to ensure German interests were protected, he informed Bernstorff that he had conveyed his 22 February note to the attorney general with the request that he instruct the US district attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richard H. Mann, to appear in the case as amicus curiae and to present to the court a copy of that note.
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Movement towards, and Issuance of, the District Court Decision
During the pendency of the trial court rulings, US officials became concerned about the possibility of Appam making a break for the high seas or of the prize crew taking action to disable or otherwise render her unusable in the event the decisions were unfavourable to the Germans. 92 In March, in response to these concerns, these officials decided to move Appam from an anchorage to a private dock in Norfolk. Bernstorff protested such a move, citing the 'increased difficulty of [Berg] controlling his crew, the danger of annoyance from curiosity seekers, and the possibility of injury from hostile sources'. 93 To forestall such an action, Bernstorff, while 'reserving all the rights of the German government in this case', gave his assurance that 'no change shall be made in the status quo with respect to the augmentation of the crew or equipment that might be considered a breach of neutrality, and that no attempt to run the vessel away will be made so long as such ship remains under the custody of [the] court'. 94 The Appam did move to a dock in April 1916, not by direction of the executive branch to secure US national security interests but, rather, as a result of a preliminary 88 Ibid. 89 action of the Court. After a survey indicated that portions of the cargo, particularly cocoa, cocoa beans and palm oil, were perishable and subject to decay and injury, the Court, upon motion by libellants, issued an order of sale. 95 Appam was accordingly taken to a dock in Newport News on 3 April 1916, where her cargo, under the watchful eye of one officer and 25 enlisted members of the 12th Company of Marines, was offloaded on 4-10 April, at which time she returned to her previous anchorage. 96 The sale netted over US $600,000, which was deposited with the registry of the Court, and the unsold portions of the cargo were placed in the custody of the marshal of the Eastern District of Virginia. The cargo was described in the decree as about 3,000 tons of general cargo, including £36,549 in gold bars. An authenticated copy of the decree was presented to the US embassy in Berlin a week later on 18 May. The other development -developments, actually -were letters from Lansing to Bernstorff on 2 March and 7 April 1916, which contained executive branch pronouncements regarding the law applicable in the Appam matter. With respect to the 1799 Treaty, Lansing informed Bernstorff that a 'reasonable interpretation' of Article 19 makes clear that it is 'applicable only to prizes which are brought into American ports by vessels of war. The Appam, however, ... was not accompanied by a ship of war, but came into the port of Norfolk alone in charge of a prize master and crew'. 99 Lansing further stated that it was clear that the 'port of refuge was not to be made a port of ultimate destination or indefinite asylum'. 100 As a result of all of this, 'the government of the United States considers itself free from any obligation to accord the Appam the privileges stipulated in Article 19 of the treaty of 1799'. this assertion was an executive branch conclusion that Hague Convention XIII was applicable between the USA and Germany, either as a conventional obligation or as an expression of customary international law, but Article 23 was not. Such a conclusion was consistent with the USA's prior resort to Hague Convention XIII in managing the internment of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich. 103 Finally, Lansing informed Bernstorff that in the event the libels were dismissed there were two possible outcomes. Either Appam would be allowed to depart from US territorial jurisdiction after she had a reasonable time to take on board such supplies as may be necessary, in the judgment of the US government, for a voyage to the nearest port subject to the sovereignty of Germany. Failing this, she would be released, and the prize master and crew interned for the remainder of the war. 104 The relevance, if any, of these developments to the deliberations of Judge Waddill remained an open issue until he issued the final decree of the Court on 29 July 1916. Waddill J stated the ultimate issue in the case as follows:
[T]he question for consideration is whether the vessel and her cargo, belonging to a subject of Great Britain, captured by a cruiser of the German Empire, upon the high seas, during the existence of war between the two countries, can be brought by a prize master and crew into the waters of the United States, for the purpose of being there laid up.
105
He then subdivided the ultimate issue into three sub-issues, each of which he dealt with in turn: (i) what are the rights existing between the USA and Germany, respecting the right of entry of prizes of war captured at sea and of asylum, in the waters of the USA, whether arising under treaty or international law; (ii) has this court jurisdiction to entertain these suits for restitution of the property in question to its owners and (iii) what is the character of the property seized, whether public or private, and can the Court, as against the German government, who claims the right to adjudicate its title by its own prize court, determine the rights thereof and afford relief as between the litigants.
106
With respect to sub-issue (i), Waddill J quoted at length from Lansing's letters to Bernstorff of 2 March and 7 April 1916 and paid them great deference, which was not surprising given the judge's further statement that 'the court is in full accord with his interpretation'. 107 Waddill J then concluded that Article 19 of the 1799 Treaty, 'when read in the light of the rulings and interpretation placed upon other contemporaneous treaties', did not permit prizes to be brought into the waters of the USA for 103 As discussed in note 59 above and accompanying text. 104 109 And even though Britain did not adopt Hague Convention XIII, Germany and the USA had done so, which to the Court demonstrated a meeting of the minds, so to speak, between the USA and Germany as to the use of their waters and harbours for belligerent prizes. Thus, as to sub-issue (i), the Court held that the 'right of belligerents to use neutral waters, as an asylum for prizes, can no longer be successfully contended for'.
110
As to sub-issue (ii), Waddill J first approvingly cited Lansing's statement in his 7 April letter to Bernstorff to the effect that the question of the Court's jurisdiction was one for judicial ascertainment and not executive determination. 111 And as to that jurisdiction, Waddill J concluded that the jurisdiction and authority of the US courts of admiralty to entertain possessory actions for the restitution to their owners of prizes of war seized for violation of the neutrality laws 'is no longer open for serious consideration'.
112 Although this question had been the source of some controversy in the early years of the republic, the issue was resolved by the US Supreme Court in the case of The Betsey. 113 There, 'the question of jurisdiction was directly raised, and the US Supreme Court held that the district courts, being possessed of all the powers of courts of admiralty -instance as well as prize courts -were competent to decide whether restitution should be made, and the law has been thus settled for more than 100 years'. In short, '[t]his power on the part of the courts of the United States may not be given specifically by any statute, as required for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, but arises from the authority reposed in them under the Constitution as courts of admiralty and common law, charged with the duty of administering the law of nations'.
114
As to sub-issue (iii), the Germans had argued that the libels respecting Appam and her cargo could not be maintained because title to the vessel and her cargo vested in the German government upon her capture and, further, that this title 'can only be inquired into and divested by' the action of a German prize court. Waddill J found it 'manifest that the claim that this court should wait, or be controlled by what the German prize court does, is without merit'. 115 According to Waddill J, such a position had been asserted in the past, and, citing the L'Invincible case, he concluded that it had been completely refuted by the US Supreme Court. 116 Thus, as to sub-issue (iii), the Court concluded that:
[t]he validity of the capture, as well as all questions of prize law, are to be determined by the German prize court, and are not matters for the consideration of this court; but this court has the right to determine whether the neutrality laws of the United States have been violated, and the consequences thereof, as bearing upon the restitution of the prize property to its owners, and in a proper case to restore the same to them.
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As none of the sub-issues resolved in Germany's favour, the Court reached the following ultimate decision and order:
[T]he manner of bringing the Appam into the waters of the United States, as well as her presence in those waters, constitutes a violation of the neutrality of the United States; that she came in without bidding or permission; that she is here in violation of law; that she is unable to leave for lack of a crew, which she cannot provide or augment without further violation of neutrality; that in her present condition, she is without lawful right to be and remain in these waters; that she, as between her captors and owners, to all practical intents and purposes, must be treated as abandoned, and stranded upon our shores; and that her owners are entitled to restitution of their property, which this court should award, irrespective of the prize court proceedings of the court of the imperial government of the German Empire; and it will be so ordered.
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Effect of Ruling; Pendency of US Supreme Court Appeal
The Germans, obviously disappointed by this ruling, quickly announced their intent to appeal to the US Supreme Court, 119 and, on 8 August, Berg and von Schilling executed an appeal bond as principals, in which they bound themselves for the full amount of the sum of US $2,000,000. The surety agreement accompanying the bond stated that '[t]he condition of this obligation is such that if ... [they] (1) shall prosecute their appeal to effect and (2) answer all damages and costs, if they fail to make good their plea, then the above obligation is void, else to remain in full force and virtue'. The same principals executed a second bond on 28 September 1916 for US $30,000 to secure their appeal of the adverse decision regarding Appam's cargo. 120 The Germans' appeal led, naturally, to immediate diplomatic wrangling regarding the status of the vessel during the pendency of the appeal. Although the vessel remained in the custody of the Court, the prize crew was left aboard, much to the ire of the British. 121 The British demanded that the prize crew be removed and the vessel, after payment of a bond, be speedily restored to mercantile service, as 'the vessel is needed at the present time and to detain her after two such decisions does not seem just. Her detention entails a loss which it might be impossible to obtain adequate compensation for.'
122 Any resolution short of the British demand would allow the Germans to 'practically gain their contention which was that they had a right to take the ship into an American port'. 123 The Foreign Office instructed Spring-Rice to inform the US government that if the prize crew was allowed to remain on board and 'in consequence the ship were ultimately destroyed or sunk, the US government would be responsible '. 124 As for the Germans, Bernstoff brought to Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk's attention the fact that at a hearing in Norfolk on 2 August, Waddill J manifested a desire and intention to order her release to her former owners upon payment of a bond. 125 The Germans opposed this, stating that 'our rights would be seriously prejudiced if the lower court should endeavor to deprive the Commander of the "Appam", a duly commissioned prize master and officer of the German Navy, of physical possession of the ship prior to the decision of all questions by the United States Supreme Court on appeal'. 126 To reassure Waddill J regarding Germany's honourable intentions as to the vessel, entrusted as it was to the custody of the Court, Bergstoff asked Lansing to relay the following pledge:
In order to relieve any apprehensions in the mind of the Court in reference to the safety of the ' Appam' pending the decision on appeal to the Supreme Court, I wish to give assurance to you on behalf of Lieutenant Berg that every effort will be made to preserve and protect the property itself as well as the relations of the vessel and its crew to the interest of your Government. No explosives capable of doing injury to the vessel or the public peace will be allowed aboard the vessel.
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This message was in fact conveyed by letter from Lansing to the attorney general on 24 August 1916.
US internal deliberations regarding this issue reflected the uncomfortableness of a situation whereby the judiciary was in a position of primacy involving a matter of such significant import to the USA's foreign policy. Upon being informed by Acting Secretary of State Polk of the German objection to restoring Appam to her former owners during the pendency of the US Supreme Court litigation, Attorney General T.W. Gregory passed on this request to Waddill J:
The State Department tells me that they regard it as of the utmost importance, for diplomatic reasons, that the Germans should not be dispossessed of the Appam pending appellate proceedings. ... I join the Secretary of State in the urgent request that no change be made in the possession of the vessel until the higher courts have passed on the question involved. Ordinarily, I would not presume to make any suggestions in regard to any matter pending before you for judicial determination. International conditions, however, are so extraordinary, and the anxiety of the State Department so pronounced that, in view of your recent generosity in expressing a willingness to consider the views of the Executive Department of the Government, I make bold to prefer this request.
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And so ultimately it was decided; Appam would remain at anchorage under the control of her prize crew pending the US Supreme Court's decision. Lansing informed SpringRice of this determination on 24 August, stating that, in view of Bernstorff 's pledge to safeguard the vessel:
I am of the opinion that there is no need for apprehension in regard to the safety of the ship, without admitting, however, on the part of my Government, that it is responsible for the effective custody of a vessel within the jurisdiction of the court pending an appeal in a case where private individuals of foreign nationality have declined to admit the results of Executive action and chosen to take advantage of such judicial proceedings as are open to them in this country.
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The US Supreme Court Decides
The US Supreme Court issued its opinion on 6 March 1917. Much had occurred between Waddill J's decision on 29 July 1916 and March 1917. Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917, which prompted the USA to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and recall its ambassador to Berlin two days later. This led also to the removal of the prize crew from Appam on that same day -3 February. 130 It was in this inauspicious (for Germany) environment that the unanimous opinion of the Court was announced. As had Waddill J, the US Supreme Court opined that the cases involved three 'decisive questions': (i) whether the use of an American port, under the circumstances shown, was a breach of this nation's neutrality under the principles of international law; (ii) whether such use of an American port was justified by the existing treaties between the German government and our own and (iii) whether there was jurisdiction and a right to condemn Appam and her cargo in a US court of admiralty. With respect to the first issue -that of the applicability of principles of international law to the Appam situation -the Court concluded that while Hague Convention XIII:
may not be a binding obligation, owing to lack of ratification, it is very persuasive as showing the attitude of the American Government when the question is one of international law; from which it appears clearly that prizes could only be brought into our ports upon general principles recognized in international law, on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions.
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Appam was not brought to the US port for any of these reasons; instead, the vessel 'proceed[ed] over a distance of more than three thousand miles, with a view to laying up' there. 133 The USA expressly 'refused to recognize the principle that prizes might enter our ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court' in its ratification process for Hague Convention XIII since 'thereby a neutral might be involved in participation in the war to the extent of giving asylum to a prize which the belligerent might not be able to conduct to a home port '. 134 As to the second 'decisive question' -that of the effect of any existing treaties between Germany and the USA -the Court first recalled that the Germans had principally relied upon Article 19 of the 1799 Treaty. With respect to that treaty, the Court agreed with the State Department's conclusion and that of the lower court that the privileges enunciated in the treaty applied to vessels of war and the prizes that accompany them into the port of a contracting party. 135 Appam, a merchant vessel, captured on the high seas and sent alone and unescorted into an American port 'with the intention of being kept there indefinitely, and without any means of leaving that port for another as contemplated in the treaty' did not qualify for these privileges.
136 'Such use of one of our ports was in no wise sanctioned by the Treaty of 1799', the Court found, and constituted 'a clear breach of the neutral rights of this Government'.
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With respect to the third 'decisive question' -that of jurisdiction of the Court -the US Supreme Court found that the vessel was in an American port and, thus, under US practice, was within the jurisdiction and possession of the District Court, which had 'assumed to determine the alleged violation of neutral rights, with power to dispose of the vessel accordingly'. 138 The German prize court ruling had no effect on the District Court's jurisdiction. Were the rule otherwise, continued the Court, 'our ports might be filled in case of a general war such as is now in progress between the European countries, with captured prizes of one or the other of the belligerents, in utter violation of the principles of neutral obligation which have controlled this country from the beginning'.
139 Accordingly, the Court found that:
[t]he violation of American neutrality is the basis of jurisdiction, and the admiralty courts may order restitution for a violation of such neutrality. In each [of the two libels being appealed] the jurisdiction and order rests upon the authority of the courts of the United States to make restitution to private owners for violations of neutrality where offending vessels are within our jurisdiction, thus vindicating our rights and obligations as a neutral people.
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As a result, the Court affirmed the decisions of the District Court in both libels.
Aftermath of US Supreme Court Decision
As a result of this decision, Appam was restored to her rightful owners on 28 March 1917, who, after a period of refit and repair, renamed her Mandingo and returned her to service on the Britain-West Africa route. 141 Waddill J re-assumed the principal remaining judicial role, which mainly consisted of unravelling the complex monetary issues related to the case. On 1 August 1917, he issued a supplemental opinion in which he made various awards out of the bond provided by Berg and von Schilling to secure their appeal, with the largest being US $447,000 to the libellants for 'damages and costs suffered by reason of the respondents' failure to prosecute their appeal to effect, and failure to make their plea good'. 142 As to the remaining balance -the property of the German government -Waddill J, after receiving a State Department opinion that '[t]here seems to be no question that, internationally, the public property of one belligerent found within the jurisdiction of the other may be rightfully taken and confiscated', 143 issued a final decree in February 1918 that 'the balance of the money in the registry of this Court, ... the sum of $323,321.21, should be declared confiscated and held to be the property of the United States, [and] doth so adjudge, order and decree'. 144 
Conclusion and Analysis
And there is the story of Appam -her saga and the diplomatic and legal angst that her capture and conveyance to America caused. An intriguing question left unanswered by the archives or the court opinions is why Appam was sent to America in the first place, instead of to Germany or the port of an ally. This contemporary analysis by Brown Scott, a renowned jurist and member of the Joint State-Navy Neutrality Board, seems to provide the best answer:
The Appam was 130 miles from the Madeiras, but the neutrality of Portugal was questionable, and the prize might not be safe in its waters. Emden, the nearest German port, was 1,590 miles away, but the British command of the sea made it dangerous if not impossible for the Appam to attempt to reach a German port in the neighborhood of the British fleet. Hampton Roads was 3,051 miles from the place of capture. The journey to this port was thought to be free, as the event proved, from British cruisers, and the Appam therefore speeded across the Atlantic to an American port to escape the consequences of British command of the seas. 145 With respect to some of the principal players in this maritime drama, Möwe continued her spectacular run of success after parting company with Appam, sinking seven more British or Allied merchant vessels before arriving home to a hero's welcome on 4 March 1916. 146 She made one additional voyage, from 22 November 1916 to 22 March 1917, but, after that, was rendered unnecessary by the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare.
Captain Harrison of Appam, though a successful plaintiff in the suit to recover Appam's cargo, did not fare nearly as well as his counterpart on Möwe. He and other merchant captains of vessels captured or sunk by Möwe had closely adhered to familiar trade routes despite repeated Admiralty insistence that they vary their routes, drawing the official admonishment that '[t]he folly of this is apparent and should be well rubbed in to all Masters confidentially'. 147 Furthermore, by failing to alter course at a right angle upon first sighting Möwe, and by failing to assume she was an enemy upon her continued approach and altering course to put her astern, Harrison violated paragraph 8 of Admiralty Instruction on 'Trade Routes during War'. This violation, so the officials concluded, played a material role in Appam's capture, as with her available speed, 'had prompt steps been taken to turn away from the raider as soon as she was sighted ... there might have been a reasonable chance of escape'. 148 As a result of Captain Harrison's 'lamentable disregard' of these instructions, the Committee of the Liverpool and London War Risks Association informed Elder Dempster that '[t]he Captain's statement has been forwarded to the Admiralty who will no doubt take action'. 149 [1908] [1909] . 150 This naval conference was deemed necessary to provide clarity as to what the 'rules of international law' were with respect to neutral and belligerent rights at sea that were to be applied by the International Prize Court established by Hague Convention XII. 151 Due to its rejection by the British House of Lords, the Declaration of London, which focused principally on prize law and the law of blockade, was not ratified by any signatory, and, as a further consequence, the International Prize Court was never established. 152 An American proposal at the beginning of World War I for a general recognition of the Declaration of London so that maritime law would have definite principles was rejected. 153 Great Britain, with the concurrence of her allies France and Russia, adopted the declaration in modified form as a statement of the principles governing her conduct of warfare at sea; however, this unilateral action by Britain and her allies was not recognized by other nations, including the USA. 154 In short, the law of maritime neutrality, particularly the law as to prizes, was in significant disarray at the time the USA was faced with the complex issues presented by the Appam, which renders all the more significant the decisions made by the USA in that case.
As to the effect of decisions of foreign prize courts respecting prizes in US waters, while Wadill J conceded the power of such a court to determine the validity of the capture, as well as all questions of prize law, he also found it to be 'manifest that the claim that [a US] court should wait, or be controlled by what [a foreign] prize court does, is without merit'. What was also made clear as a result of the Appam matter is that 'the public property of one belligerent found within the jurisdiction of another may be rightfully taken and confiscated'. 155 Article 19 of the 1799 Treaty was revealed to be a dead letter, with the German contention as to unescorted prizes being rejected as an 'ancient abuse' and the balance of its provisions yielding to the modern statement of the law, which were contained in Articles 21 and 22 of Hague Convention XIII. Also most emphatically rejected as a component of the American law of neutrality was the modern incarnation of the 'ancient abuse' -Article 23 of Hague Convention XIII. As stated by the US Supreme Court, the USA had expressly 'refused to recognize the principle that prizes might enter our ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court', since 'thereby a neutral might be involved in participation in the war to the extent of giving asylum to a prize which the belligerent might not be able to conduct to a home port'. In short, the Appam case clearly established that, as Secretary Lansing stated, US ports will not be available to belligerents as a place to deposit the 'spoils of war'.
A further consequence of the Appam case is that the USA indicated its willingness to adhere to the principles of Hague Convention XIII to the extent the principles at issue reflect a meeting of the minds of the involved nations, notwithstanding any purported limitation on the applicability of the treaty in Article 28. Whether such adherence would be owed as a conventional obligation or because of Hague Convention XIII's incorporation and reflection of customary international law is not entirely clear and would probably be determined on a principle-by-principle basis. But, at a minimum, as the US Supreme Court stated, Hague Convention XIII is 'very persuasive as showing the attitude of the American Government when the question is one of international law'.
What was made entirely clear as a result of the Appam case is perhaps its most important conclusion, that Articles 21 and 22 of Hague Convention XIII were a 'declaration of the existing law of nations'. 156 As a result, under US practice, prizes may only be brought into US ports on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather or want of fuel or provisions, and, furthermore, under Article 22, a prize brought into a US port for any other reason must be ordered to leave at once, and should it fail to do so, the USA is authorized and obliged to release the prize and intern the prize crew. President Franklin D. Roosevelt restated this principle of law in his neutrality declaration at the onset of World War II, 157 and it remains a cornerstone of US doctrine vis-à-vis prizes in US ports. 158 Also, because of its status as customary international law, the USA considers this to be a binding obligation on all other neutrals or at least those that have ratified Hague Convention XIII and made no reservations as to those articles. Such a position was strongly asserted by the USA to all involved states in the matter of the US-flagged SS City of Flint, which was seized in 1939 by Germany after the outbreak of World War II and conveyed to ports in Norway and the Soviet Union before being released by Norwegian authorities for violating Article 21.
Though not directly an issue in the Appam litigation, one final principle of general international law that was strongly affirmed was that of the power of a sovereign state within its own territorial waters. As stated by a US court called on to unravel some lingering financial issues following the US Supreme Court's Appam decision,
[t]he captor's title and possession was forfeited, not for any violation of international law, but for an infraction of American law, and restitution decreed because of a violation of American neutrality; that is, of our own fixed ideas of what could and should be done in our own waters. The private owners of hull and cargo profited by the tort committed in the territorial waters of the United States and against the United States. 160 This principle is fully consonant with the US Supreme Court's decision in the Wildenhus case of 1887, in which the Court said that '[i]t is part of the law of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports of another, ... it subjects itself to the law of the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two countries have come to some different understanding or agreement' 161 and, with modern international law, as reflected in, for example, Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
